A true concurrent model of smart contracts executions by Bartoletti, Massimo et al.
A true concurrent model of smart contracts executions
Massimo Bartoletti
University of Cagliari
bart@unica.it
Letterio Galletta
IMT Lucca
letterio.galletta@imtlucca.it
Maurizio Murgia
University of Cagliari
maurizio.murgia@unica.it
ABSTRACT
One of the key features of modern blockchain platforms is the
possibility of executing smart contracts, i.e. computer programs that
transfer digital assets between users, according to pre-agreed rules.
Crucially, the execution of smart contracts must be correct even
in the presence of (a minority of) adversaries in the peer-to-peer
network that maintains the blockchain. To enforce this property
without a trusted authority, the nodes follow a consensus protocol,
which determines which node can extend the blockchain at each
moment. To this aim, nodes first collect a set of transactions from the
network, representing the actions on the smart contracts required
by users. Then, to compute the new state of the smart contracts,
they put these transactions in sequence (in an arbitrary order), and
execute them serially. Once this block of transactions is appended
to the blockchain, the other nodes of the network validate it, by re-
executing the transactions in the same order. The serial execution of
transactions does not take advantage of the multi-core architecture
of modern processors, so contributing to limit the throughput of
blockchains. In this paper we devise a static analysis technique for
parallelizing the execution of transactions, in a formal setting based
on Ethereum, the most widespread platform for smart contracts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→ Distributed computing models;
Program analysis.
KEYWORDS
Ethereum; smart contracts; static analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern blockchain systems are fully distributed platforms which
allow for the execution of smart contracts, i.e. computer programs
that transfer digital assets between users without a trusted author-
ity. One of the most used and studied platforms for smart contracts
is Ethereum [13], a decentralized virtual machine that runs con-
tracts written in a Turing-complete bytecode language. Intuitively,
an Ethereum contract is similar to an object in an object-oriented
language: it has an internal state and a set of procedures to ma-
nipulate this state. Additionally, a contract controls an amount of
crypto-currency, that it can exchange with other users and con-
tracts. Users interact with the Ethereum blockchain by sending
transactions, which represent procedure calls to contracts, and may
possibly involve a transfer of currency from the caller to the callee.
The sequence of transactions on the blockchain determines the
state of each contract, and the balance of each user.
The blockchain is maintained by a peer-to-peer network of nodes,
which follow a consensus protocol to determine, at each turn, who
can append a new block of transactions to the blockchain. This
protocol guarantees the correct execution of contracts, and ensures
that all the nodes have the same view of their state. Currently, trans-
actions are processed by thousands of nodes, which play either the
role of miner or that of validator. Miners gather from the network
sets of transactions requested by users, and execute sequentially
their procedure calls to determine the new state of the blockchain.
While doing so, they search for the solution of a cryptographic
puzzle: the miner who solves it first gains the right to append its
block of transactions to the blockchain; in exchange for its solution,
the miner receives a reward in crypto-currency, collecting the fees
attached to the user transactions.
Once a block is appended to the blockchain, validators re-execute
all its transactions, to update the state of all contracts and the
balance of all users. To do this, validators process the transactions
exactly in the same order in which they occur in the block, since
choosing a different order could potentially result in inconsistencies
between the nodes.
As highlighted above, both miners and validators execute trans-
actions in a purely sequential fashion. Although this is quite effec-
tive to ensure the consistency of the blockchain state, in the age
of multi-core processors it fails to properly exploit the computa-
tional capabilities of nodes. The result is that the throughput and
the scalability of the current blockchain systems are more limited
than necessary. By enabling miners and validators to concurrently
execute transactions, it would be possible to improve the efficiency
and the throughput of the blockchain.
Contributions This paper proposes a static analysis approach
to improve the efficiency of the execution of smart contracts in
Ethereum, by exploiting concurrency. More specifically, our main
contributions can be summarised as follows:
• We introduce a core calculus for smart contracts, inspired by
Solidity, the most widely used high-level language for devel-
oping contracts in Ethereum. Our calculus, called TinySol,
features a minimal imperative core, which we extend with a
novel construct to call contracts and transfer currency. We
formalise the semantics of TinySol in a big-step operational
style. We show our calculus expressive enough to reproduce
some typical quirks of Solidity, like e.g. reentrancy attacks.
• We formalise transactions as calls to contract procedures,
and blockchains as sequences of transactions. We define the
semantics of a blockchain as a function which maps each
contract to its state. This semantics reflects the current serial
implementation of Ethereum nodes, where transactions are
evaluated in sequence, without any concurrency.
• We introduce two notions of swappability of transactions.
The first notion is purely semantic: two adjacent transactions
can be swapped within a blockchain if doing so does not alter
the semantics of the blockchain. This notion is undecidable,
as a consequence of the Turing-completeness of TinySol. The
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second notion, called strong swappability, is more syntacti-
cal: assuming a static analysis which safely approximates the
sets of variables read/written by a transaction, we check a
simple condition on these approximations, inspired by Bern-
stein’s conditions [9] for the parallel execution of processes.
We show in Theorem 6 that strong swappability is strictly in-
cluded in the semantic relation. Further, we prove that if we
transform a blockchain by repeatedly exchanging adjacent
strongly swappable transactions, the resulting blockchain is
observationally equivalent to the original one.
• Building upon strong swappability, we devise a true concur-
rent model of transactions execution. To this purpose, we
transform a block of transactions B into an occurrence net
N# (B), a classic true-concurrent model of computation [33].
This occurrence net describes exactly the partial order in-
duced by the swappability relation. We model the concurrent
executions ofB in terms of the step firing sequences (i.e. finite
sequences of sets of transitions) of the occurrence net N# (B).
Theorem 13 establishes that the concurrent executions of B
and the serial one are semantically equivalent.
• We describe howminers and validators can use our results to
concurrently execute transactions, exploiting the multi-core
architecture available on their nodes. Remarkably, our tech-
nique is compatibile with the current implementation of the
Ethereum blockchain, while the other existing approaches to
parallelize transactions execution would require a soft-fork.
Summing up, our paper provides a formal backbone to study
concurrency issues in Ethereum, spanning from a formal high-level
language for smart contracts, to a model of Ethereum transactions.
Because of space constraints, we relegate the proofs of our results,
as well as auxiliary examples and results, to the Appendix.
2 RELATEDWORK
Although the seminal idea of smart contract dates back to the
90s [37], their first implementations on decentralized ledgers were
put into practice in 2012 on Bitcoin [1], and in 2015 on Ethereum [13].
Since then, the research has evolved along different directions; the
most relevant ones for our paper are: (i) improvements of the ex-
ecution of smart contracts; (ii) static analysis and verification of
smart contracts; (iii) domain-specific languages for smart contracts.
We briefly survey the literature along these lines.
Optimizing transactions execution A few works study how to
parallelize the execution of smart contracts on Ethereum, [6, 18, 19],
using dynamic techniques adopted from software transactional
memory. These works are focussed on empirical aspects (e.g., mea-
suring the speedup obtained on a given benchmark), while we
focus on the theoretical counterpart. In [18, 19], miners execute a
set of transactions speculatively in parallel, using abstract locks
and inverse logs to dynamically discover conflicts and to recover
from inconsistent states. The obtained execution is guaranteed to
be equivalent to a serial execution of the same set of transactions.
The work [6] proposes a conceptually similar technique, but based
on optimistic software transactional memory. Since speculative
execution is non-deterministic, in both approaches miners need to
communicate the chosen schedule of transactions to validators, to
allow them to correctly validate the block. This schedule must be
embedded in the mined block: since Ethereum does not support
this kind of block metadata, these approaches would require a “soft-
fork” of the blockchain to be implemented in practice. Compared
to these works, in which conflicts are detected dynamically, our
approach detects potential conflicts by means of a static analysis.
Since software transactional memory introduces a run-time over-
head, in principle a purely static technique could allow for faster
executions, at the price of a preprocessing phase.
In the permissioned setting, Hyperledger Fabric [4] follows the
“execute first and then order” paradigm: transactions are executed
speculatively, and then their ordering is checked for correctness1.
In this paradigm, appending a transaction requires a few steps.
First, a client proposes a transaction to a set of “endorsing” peers,
which simulate the transaction without updating the blockchain.
The output of the simulation includes the state updates of the
transaction execution, and the sets of read/written keys. These sets
are then signed by the endorsing peers, and returned to the client,
which submits them to the “ordering” peers. These nodes order
transactions in blocks, and send them to the “committing” peers,
which validate them. A block T1 · · · Tn is valid when, if a key k is
read by transaction Ti , then k has not been written by a transaction
Tj with j < i . Finally, validated blocks of transactions are appended
to the blockchain. Our model is coherent with Ethereum, which
does not support speculative execution of transactions.
Static analysis and verification Driven by the proliferation of
attacks to Ethereum contracts, which have caused major money
losses, many researchers have developed analysis and verification
techniques to make smart contracts more secure. Several papers
focus on EVM, the bytecode language interpreted by Ethereum
nodes, and target of the compilation of higher-level contract lan-
guages. The work [26] gives a partial formalisation of the semantics
of EVM, and exploits symbolic execution to detect some common
vulnerability patterns of EVM contracts. A similar goal is pursued
by [38], which, rather than symbolic execution, is based on the
analysis of dependency graphs. The works [22, 23] formalise exe-
cutable semantics of EVM, validated against the official Ethereum
test suite; these semantics are the basis of static verifiers of EVM
contracts, like e.g. [21]. The work [10] translates EVM into F∗, and
uses its verification tools to detect vulnerabilities. The work [24]
uses the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [32] to verify the EVM code
obtained by compiling a fragment of the Ethereum Name Service.
The work [35] proposes a strongly typed intermediate language for
contracts, which are modelled as Communicating Automata; this
richer structure (compared to EVM), simplifies formal reasoning,
making contracts more amenable to verification. Similarly to some
of the above-mentioned works, also ours pursues a static approach
to the analysis of smart contracts; however, our goal substantially
differs from that of other papers, which are focussed on finding
security vulnerabilities. Indeed, our goal is to use static analysis
to compute the set of keys that are read and written by a transac-
tion, called read/write sets. There are many papers in the literature
proposing static analyses for this purpose. The paper [17] describes
1https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/release-1.4/readwrite.html
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an analysis based on separation logic. The analysis is used to re-
solve conflicts in the setting of snapshot isolation for transactional
memory in Java. When a conflict is detected, the read/write sets
are used to determine how the code can be modified to resolve it.
Also [15] presents a static analysis to infer read and write locations
in a C-like language with atomic sections. The analysis is used to
translate atomic sections into standard lock operations. Our work
differs from [15, 17], because our goal is not to define a new analysis
for read/write sets, but given such an analysis, to leverage it for
determining which transactions can be run concurrently.
Domain-specific languages The most common high-level lan-
guage for developing Ethereum contracts is Solidity [3], a Javascript-
like language officially supported by the Ethereum Foundations. In-
spired by some harmful patterns appearing in Solidity contracts [7],
a few works have proposed domain-specific contract languages,
with the goal of improving their security. The languages proposed
in [11, 34] are targeted to the financial contracts of [25], which are
compiled, respectively, to Ethereum and to the Cardano blockchain.
The works [27, 28] model smart contracts as finite automata with
guarded transitions, and translate them into Solidity. Further, [28]
develops a verification technique for safety and liveness properties
on these models, based on a translation to NuSMV, the input lan-
guage of the nuXmv symbolic model checker [14]. The correctness
of this technique is supported by a formalisation of the semantics
of a subset of Solidity. The work [16] proposes Featherweight So-
lidity (FS), a formalisation of some key features of Solidity in the
style of Featherweight Java, including a type system which detects
some run-time errors. FS features a richer syntax compared to our
TinySol: actually, our design choice was to start from a basic im-
perative language, and extend it with a single contract-oriented
primitive. A further difference is that FS models blockchains as
functions from contract identifiers to states; instead, we represent a
blockchain as a sequence of transactions, and then we reconstruct
the state by giving a semantics to this sequence. In this way we are
able to reason about concurrent executions of transactions.
3 A CORE CALCULUS FOR CONTRACTS
In this section we formalise Ethereum contracts in a core calculus,
that we call TinySol (for “Tiny Solidity”). Besides minimal impera-
tive features, like e.g. assignment, conditionals and loops, TinySol
has contract-specific features for sending currency and calling con-
tracts. We first formalise the syntax and semantics of contracts in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2; then in Section 3.3 we introduce blockchains,
defining how transactions affect the state of contracts. We discuss
the main differences between TinySol and Solidity in Section 6.
3.1 Syntax of contracts
We assume a set Val of values v ,k , . . ., a set Const of constant
names x ,y, . . ., a set of procedure names f, g, . . .. and a set Addr of
addresses X,Y, . . ., partitioned into account addresses A,B, . . . and
contract addresses C,D, . . .. We write sequences in bold, e.g. v is
a sequence of values; ϵ is the empty sequence. We use n ,n′, . . . to
range over N, and b,b ′, . . . to range over boolean values.
A contract is a finite set of terms of the form f(x ){S}, where S is
a statement, with syntax in Figure 1. Intuitively, each term f(x ){S}
S ::= statement
skip skip
| throw exception
| E :=E′ store update
| S ; S′ sequence
| if E then S else S′ conditional
| while E do S loop
| E0 : f(E1)$E2 call
E ::= expression
⊥ undefined
| v value
| x const name
| X address
| opE operator
| ?E store lookup
| X : E context
Figure 1: Syntax of TinySol.
represents a procedure of the contract, where f is the procedure
name, x are its formal parameters (omitted when empty), and S is
the procedure body. Each contract has a key-value store, which we
model as a partial function from keys k ∈ Val to values v ∈ Val.
Statements extend those of a basic imperative language with
three constructs inspired by Solidity:
• throw raises an uncatchable exception, rolling-back the state;
• k :=E updates the store, binding the key k to the value denoted
by the expression E ;
• X : f(v)$n calls the procedure f (with actual parametersv ) of
the contract at address X, transferring n units of currency to X.
The expressions used within statements (Figure 1) can be con-
stants (e.g., integers, booleans, strings), addresses, and operations
between expressions. We assume that all the usual arithmetic, logic
and cryptographic operators are provided (since their definition is
standard, we will not detail them). The expression ?k denotes the
value bound to the key k in the contract store (when k is unbound,
?k evaluates to the “undefined” value, written ⊥). The expression
X : E evaluates E in the context of the address X. For instance,
X : ?k denotes the value bound to k in the store of X.
We assume a mapping Γ from addresses to contracts, such that
Γ(A) = {fskip(){skip}} for all account addresses A. This allows
for a uniform treatment of account and contract addresses: indeed,
calling a procedure on an account address A can only result in a
pure currency transfer to A, since the procedure can only perform
a skip (see Section 3.2).
We further postulate that: (i) expressions and statements are
well-typed: e.g., guards in conditionals and in loops have type bool;
(ii) the procedures in Γ(C) have distinct names; (iii) the key balance
cannot stay at the left of an assignment; (iv) the constant names
sender, value cannot stay in the formal parameters of a procedure.
We use the following syntactic sugar. For a call X : f(v)$n ,
when there is no money transfer (i.e., n = 0) we just write it as
X : f(v); when the target is an account address A (so, the call is to
the procedure fskip), we write it as A$n .
3.2 Semantics of contracts
A state σ : Addr→ (Val ⇀ Val) maps each address to a key-value
store, i.e. a partial function from values (keys) to values. When a
key k is not bound to any value in σ X, we write σ X k = ⊥. We
postulate that domσA = {balance} for all account addresses A,
and domσC ⊇ {balance} for all contract addresses C. A qualified
key is a term of the form X.k . We write σ(X.k) for σXk ; we use
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p,q , . . . to range over qualified keys, and P ,Q , . . . to range over sets
of qualified keys. We denote with P the set of all qualified keys.
A state update π : Addr ⇀ (Val ⇀ Val) is a substitution from
qualified keys to values; we denote with {v/X .k} the state update
which maps X.k tov . We define keys(π) as the set of qualified keys
X.k such that X ∈ domπ and k ∈ domπX. We apply updates to
states as follows:
(σπ)X = δX where δXk =
{
πXk if X.k ∈ keys(π)
σXk otherwise
We define the following auxiliary operators on states:
σ ◦ X : n = σ{(σXbalance) ◦n/X .balance} (◦ ∈ {+,−})
Intuitively, σ +X : n updates the state σ by increasing the balance
of X of n currency units.
Definition 1 gives the operational semantics of statements, in
a big-step style. The semantics of a statement S is parameterised
over a state σ , an address X (the contract wherein S is evaluated),
and an environment ρ : Const ⇀ Val, used to evaluate the formal
parameters as well as the special names sender and value. Note
that executing S may affect both the store of X and, in case of pro-
cedure calls, also the store of other contracts. Instead, the semantics
of an expression is a value; so, expressions have no side effects. We
assume that all the semantic operators are strict, i.e. their result is
⊥ if some operand is ⊥.
Definition 1 (Semantics of statements). We denote by JSKXσ,ρ
the semantics of a statement S in a given state σ , environment ρ ,
and address X, where the partial function J·KXσ,ρ is defined by the
inference rules in Figure 2.
We briefly comment the rules in Figure 2. The semantics of ex-
pressions is straightforward; note that we use op to denote syntactic
operators, and op for their semantic counterpart. The environment
ρ is used to evaluate constant names x , while the state σ is used to
evaluate store lookups ?E . The semantics of statements is mostly
standard, except for the last rule. A procedure call E0 : f(E1)$E2
within X has a defined semantics iff: (i) E0 evaluates to an address
Y; (ii) E2 evaluates to a non-negative number n , not exceeding
the balance of X; (iii) the contract at Y has a procedure named f
(with formal parameters x ; (iv) E1 evaluates to a sequence of values
(whose length matches that of x ). If all these conditions hold, then
the procedure body S is executed in a state where X’s balance is
decreased by n , Y’s balance is increased by n , and in an environ-
ment where the formal parameters are bound to the actual ones,
and the special names sender and value are bound, respectively,
to X (the caller) and n (the value transferred to Y).
Example 1 (Wallet). Consider the following procedures of the
contract at address C:
f() {if sender = A then skip else throw}
g(x ,y) {if sender = A && value = 0&&?balance ≥ x
then y$x else throw}
The procedure f allowsA to deposit funds to the contract; dually, g
allows A to transfer funds to other addresses. The guard sender =
A ensures that only A can invoke the procedures of C; calls from
other addresses result in a throw, which leaves the state of contract
C unchanged (in particular, the throw reverts the currency transfer
from sender to C). Additionally, the procedure g checks that no
currency is transferred along with the contract call (value = 0),
and that the balance of C is enough (?balance ≥ x ).
Let Sg = ifb theny$x else throw, whereb is defined as: sender =
A && value = 0&&?balance ≥ x . Letσ be such thatσCbalance =
3, and let ρ = {A/sender, 0/value, 2/x ,B/y}. We evaluate JSgKCσ,ρ :JSgKCσ,ρ = Jy$xKCσ,ρ = Jy : fskip()$xKCσ,ρ
= JskipKBσ−C:2+B:2, {C/sender,1/value}
= σ − C : 2 +B : 2
Instead, if σCbalance < 2, or ρsender , A, or ρvalue , 0, we
would have JSgKCσ,ρ = ⊥.
Example 2 (Reentrancy). Consider the following procedures:
f(x ,b){ifb then {D : g(); x$value} else skip} ∈ Γ(C)
g(){sender : f(B, false)} ∈ Γ(D)
Intuitively, f first calls g, and then transfers value units of currency
to the address x . The procedure g attempts to change the recipient
of the currency by calling back f, setting the parameter x to B. We
show below that this attack fails.
Let S = C : f(A, true)$1. We evaluate JSKXσ,ρ as follows, for all
σ and ρ such that σCbalance = 1:JSKXσ,ρ = Jifb then {D : g(); x$value} else skipKCσ,ρ′
where ρ ′ = {C/sender, 1/value, true/b,A/x}
= JD : g(); x$valueKCσ,ρ′
= Jx$valueKCσ ′,ρ′
where σ ′ = JD : g()KCσ,ρ′
= σ ′ − C : 1 +A : 1
where σ ′ is obtained as follows:
σ ′ = JD : g()KCσ,ρ′
= Jsender : f(B, false)KDσ, {C/sender,0/value}
= Jifb then {D : g(); x$value} else skipKCσ,ρ′′
where ρ ′′ = {D/sender, 0/value, false/b,B/x}
= JskipKCσ,ρ′′
= σ
Since σ ′ = σ , we conclude that JSKCσ,ρ = σ − C : 1 + A : 1. So, g
has failed its attempt to divert the currency transfer to B.
Example 3 (Vicious reentrancy). Consider the following proce-
dures f in Γ(C) and g in Γ(D):
f(){if ?k = undef&&?balance ≥ 1
then {D : g()$1; k :=true} else skip}
g(){C : f()}
Intuitively, f would like to transfer 1 unit of currency to contract
D, by calling its function g. The guard ?k = undef is intended to
ensure that the transfer happens exactly once.
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JvKXσ,ρ = v JxKXσ,ρ = ρ x JYKXσ,ρ = Y JopEKXσ,ρ = op JEKXσ,ρ J?EKXσ,ρ = σ X (JEKXσ,ρ ) JY : EKXσ,ρ = JEKYσ,ρ
JskipKXσ,ρ = σ
JEKXσ,ρ = bJif E then Strue else SfalseKXσ,ρ = JSb KXσ,ρ
JEKXσ,ρ = falseJwhile E do SKXσ,ρ = σ
JEKXσ,ρ = true JSKXσ,ρ = σ ′Jwhile E do SKXσ,ρ = Jwhile E do SKXσ ′,ρ
JEKXσ,ρ = k , ⊥ JE′KXσ,ρ = vJE :=E′KXσ,ρ = σ{v/X .k}
JS0KXσ,ρ = σ ′JS0; S1KXσ,ρ = JS1KXσ ′,ρ
JE0KXσ,ρ = YJE1KXσ,ρ = v JE2K
X
σ,ρ = n ≤ σ X balance
f(x ){S} ∈ Γ(Y)
σ ′ = σ − X : n + Y : n
ρ ′ = {X/sender, n/value,v/x}
JE0 : f(E1)$E2KXσ,ρ = JSKYσ ′, ρ′
Figure 2: Semantics of statements and expressions.
Let σ be such that σCbalance = n ≥ 1 and σCk = ⊥, and let
ρ = {D/sender, 0/value}, ρ ′ = {C/sender, 1/value}. Let Sf and Sg be
the bodies of f and g, respectively. We have:
JSfKCσ,ρ = JD : g()$1; k :=trueKCσ,ρ = Jk :=trueKCσ1,ρ
σ1 = JD : g()$1KCσ,ρ = JSgKDσ−C:1+D:1,ρ′
= JSfKCσ−C:1+D:1,ρ
= JD : g()$1; k :=trueKCσ−C:1+D:1,ρ
= Jk :=trueKCσ2,ρ
σ2 = JD : g()$1KCσ−C:1+D:1,ρ = JSgKDσ−C:2+D:2,ρ′
= Jk :=trueKCσ3,ρ
σi = Jk :=trueKCσi+1,ρ (for i ∈ 3 . . .n − 1)
σn = JskipKCσ−C:n+D:n,ρ = σ − C : n +D : n
Summing up, JSfKCσ,ρ = (σ−C : n+D : n){true/k}, i.e.D has drained
all the currency from C. The famous “DAO Attack” on Ethereum,
which caused a huge loss of currency in June 2016, exploited this
kind of vulnerability [2, 7].
Example 4 (Two-players lottery). In Figure 3 we code in TinySol
a two-players lottery, inspired by the ones in [5, 30]. The players
p1 and p2 bet 1 unit of currency each; additionally, they deposit 2
units of currency as collateral, which are used as compensation in
case of dishonest behaviour. The procedure join allows the players
to join the lottery; the parameter h is the hash of a secret, used to
implement a timed commitment protocol [12, 20, 36]. The check
h = ?h1 at line 7 serves to avoid an attack where the second
player replays hash of the first one. The procedure leave allows
the first player to leave the lottery, if no other player joins before
time t0. Note that time is provided by an oracle, modelled by the
contract Clock. The procedure reveal allows players to reveal
their secrets: when this happens, the player redeems her collateral.
Finally, the procedure win determines the winner of the lottery,
who will collect the bets. If both players have revealed their secrets,
then the winner is p1 or p2, depending on the parity of the sum of
the secrets. Otherwise, one player can redeem the bets if she has
revealed her secret and the deadline t0 has passed.
1 contract TinyLottery
2 {
3 join(h) {
4 if (?nPlayers = 2 || value != 3) then throw
5 else if ?nPlayers = undef
6 then { p1 := sender; h1 := h, nPlayers := 1;
7 t0 := Clock:time+1000 }
8 else if (h = ?h1) then throw
9 else { p2 := sender; h2 := h, nPlayers := 2 }
10 }
11 leave() {
12 if (sender = ?p1 && ?nPlayers = 1 && Clock:time > t0)
13 then { ?p1 $ ?balance; nPlayers := undef; s1 := undef }
14 else throw
15 }
16 reveal(s) {
17 if (?nPlayers != 2) then throw
18 else if (sender = ?p1 && hash(s) = ?h1 && ?s1 = undef)
19 then { s1 := s; ?p1 $ 2 }
20 else if (sender = ?p2 && hash(s) = ?h2 && ?s2 = undef)
21 then { s2 := s; ?p2 $ 2 }
22 else throw
23 }
24 win() {
25 if (?s1 != undef && ?s2 != undef)
26 then if ((?s1 + ?s2) %2 = 0) then ?p1 $ 2 else ?p2 $ 2
27 else if (?s1 != undef && Clock:time > t0) then ?p1 $ 2
28 else if (?s2 != undef && Clock:time > t0) then ?p2 $ 2
29 else throw
30 }
31 }
Figure 3: A two-players lottery.
3.3 Transactions and blockchains
A transaction2 T is a term of the form:
A
n−→ C : f(v)
Intuitively, A is the address of the caller, C is the address of the
called contract, f is the called procedure, n is the value transferred
from A to C, and v is the sequence of actual parameters. We de-
note with Tx the set of all transactions. We give the semantics of
transactions in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Semantics of transactions). We denote the se-
mantics of T in σ as JTKσ , where the function J·Kσ is defined by the
rules in Figure 4.
We briefly comment the rules in Figure 4. The semantics of a
transaction T = A
n−→ C : f(v), in a given blockchain state σ , is
2Note that the notion of transaction in Ethereum is quite different from the homony-
mous notion used in the field of transactional memory (TM). While in TM a transaction
is just a sequence of read/write operations on objects, in Ethereum a transaction is
a message from an account to a contract, which triggers the execution of one of the
contract procedures. To avoid confusion, in this paper we use a different terminology
than the one typically used in TM.
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f(x ){S} ∈ Γ(C) σ A balance ≥ nJSKCσ−A:n+C:n, {A/sender,n/value,v/x } = σ ′JA n−→ C : f(v)Kσ = σ ′ [Tx1]
f(x ){S} ∈ Γ(C)
( σ A balance < n orJSKCσ−A:n+C:n, {A/sender,n/value,v/x } = ⊥
)
JA n−→ C : f(v)Kσ = σ [Tx2]
Figure 4: Semantics of transactions.
a new state σ ′. Rule [Tx1] handles the case where the transaction
is successful: this happens when A’s balance is at least n , and the
procedure call terminates in a non-error state. Note that n units
of currency are transferred to C before starting to execute f, and
that the names sender and value are set, respectively, to A and n .
Instead, rule [Tx2] applies either when A’s balance is not enough, or
the execution of f fails (this also covers the case when f does not
terminate). In these cases, T does not alter the state, i.e. σ ′ = σ .
Example 5. Recall the contract C from Example 1, and let:
T0 = A
3−→ C : f() T1 = A 0−→ C : g(2,B)
Let Sf = if sender = A then skip else throw be the body of pro-
cedure f. Let σ be such that σAbalance = 5 and σCbalance = 0.
By rule [Tx1] we have that:
JT0Kσ = JSfKCσ−A:3+C:3, {A/sender,3/value}
= JskipKCσ−A:3+C:3, {A/sender,3/value}
= σ −A : 3 + C : 3
Now, let σ ′ = σ −A : 3 + C : 3. By rule [Tx1] we have that:
JT1Kσ ′ = JSgKCσ ′, {A/sender,0/value,2/x,B/y }
= Jy$xKCσ ′, {A/sender,0/value,2/x,B/y }
= σ ′ − C : 2 +B : 2
If now we evaluate T1 in σ ′′ = σ ′ − C : 2 +B : 2, by rule [Tx2] we
obtain JT1Kσ ′′ = σ ′′.
A blockchain B is a finite sequence of transactions; we denote
with ϵ the empty blockchain. The semantics of a blockchain is
obtained by folding the semantics of its transactions (Definition 3).
Note that erroneous transactions can occur within a blockchain,
but they have no effect on its semantics (as rule [Tx2] makes them
identities w.r.t. the append operation). We assume that in the initial
state of the blockchain, denoted by σ⋆, each addressX has a balance
n⋆
X
≥ 0, while all the other keys are unbound.
Definition 3 (Semantics of blockchains). The semantics of block-
chains is defined inductively as follows:JϵKσ = σ JTBKσ = JBKJTKσ
We write JBK for JBKσ⋆ , where σ⋆X = {n⋆X/balance}. We say that
a state σ is reachable if σ = JBK for some B.
4 SWAPPING TRANSACTIONS
In this section we define when two transactions can be swapped.
Intuitively, this happens when, given any blockchain, the order in
which we append the two transactions is immaterial to determine
the new state of the blockchain. More precisely, we require that the
resulting states are observationally equivalent, i.e. they agree on the
values associated to all the qualified keys. We formalise below a
slightly more general notion of equivalence, which is parameterised
on a set of qualified keys P over which we require the agreement.
Definition 4 (Observational equivalence). For all P ⊆ P, we
define the relation ∼P between blockchain states as follows:
σ ∼P σ ′ iff ∀p ∈ P : σp = σ ′p
We say that σ and σ ′ are observationally equivalent, in symbols
σ ∼ σ ′, when σ ∼P σ ′ holds for all P .
The following lemma ensures that ∼P is an equivalence relation,
and that it is preserved when narrowing the set P .
Lemma 1. For all P ⊆ P: (i) ∼P is an equivalence relation; (ii) if
σ ∼P σ ′ and Q ⊆ P , then σ ∼Q σ ′; (iii) ∼=∼P.
Weextend the semantic relation∼ to syntactic entities (blockchains),
by passing through their semantics. For all P , we define the relation
∼P between blockchains as follows:
B ∼P B′ iff ∀ reachable σ : JBKσ ∼P JB′Kσ
and we write B ∼ B′ when B ∼P B′ holds for all P . The relation
that ∼ is a congruence with respect to the append operation, i.e.
if B ∼ B′ then we can replace B with B′ in a larger blockchain,
preserving its semantics.
Lemma 2. B ∼ B′ =⇒ ∀B0,B1 : B0BB1 ∼ B0B′B1.
We say that two transactions are swappable when exchanging
their order preserves observational equivalence.
Definition 5 (Swappability). Two transactions T , T′ are swap-
pable, in symbols T ⇄ T′, when TT′ ∼ T′T.
Example 6. Consider the following procedures:
f0(){x :=1} f1(){if ?x = 0 thenB$1} f2(){B$1}
of a contract at address C, and consider the transactions:
T0 = A
0−→ C : f0() T1 = A 1−→ C : f1() T2 = A 1−→ C : f2()
We have T0 ⇄ T2 and T1 ⇄ T2, but T0 ̸⇄ T1 (see Figure 5).
We shall use the theory of trace languages originated from
Mazurkiewicz’s works [29] to study observational equivalence un-
der various swapping relations. For convenience, we fix the alphabet
of trace languages as the set Tx of all transactions.
Definition 6 (Mazurkiewicz equivalence). Let I be a symmetric
and irreflexive relation overTx. TheMazurkiewicz equivalence ≃I is
the least congruence in the monoid Tx∗ such that, for all T, T′ ∈ Tx:
T I T′ =⇒ TT′ ≃I T′T.
The following theorem establishes that a blockchain can be trans-
formed into an observationally equivalent one by a finite number
of exchanges of adjacent swappable transactions.
Theorem 3. ≃⇄ ⊆ ∼.
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σ ′ = σ −A : 1 +B : 1
σ σ{1/C .x} σ ′{1/C .x}
σ σ{1/C .x}
T
0
T0σ
A
ba
la
nc
e≥
1
T 2
T2
σA
balance<1
σAbalance≥1
T2
σAbalance<1
T2
T0
(a) Proof of T0 ⇄ T2.
σ ′ = σ −A : 1 +B : 1 σ ′{1/C .x}
σ σCx = 0σAbalance ≥ 1
σ{1/C .x} σ{1/C .x} −A : 1
T0
/T
1
T0
T1
(b) Proof of T0 ̸⇄ T1.
σ ′′ −A : 1 +B : 1
σ σ ′ σ ′′
σ ′′ −A : 1 + C : 1
/
T2
T1
T0
T2
T1
σ ′ = σ −A : 1 +B : 1 σ ′′ = σ ′{1/C .x}
(c) Proof of T1T0T2 ≁ T2T0T1.
Figure 5: Proofs for Example 6. A transition T from σ can be taken only if the guard below the arrow is satisfied in σ .
Example 7. By Theorem 3, we can rearrange the transactions
in Example 6 as follows: T0T1T2 ∼ T0T2T1 ∼ T2T0T1. Note in-
stead that T1T0T2 ≁ T2T0T1 (e.g., starting from a state σ such that
σAbalance = 2 and σCx = 0).
Note that the converse of Theorem 3 does not hold: indeed,
B ≃⇄ B′ requires that B and B′ have the same length, while
B ∼ B′ may also hold for blockchains of different length (e.g.,
B′ = BT, where T always throws an exception).
Since TinySol is Turing-equivalent, we have the following:
Proposition 4. The relation⇄ is undecidable.
Safe approximations of read/written keys We devise a static
approach to detect when transactions are swappable. To this pur-
pose, we independently analyse the code of the procedures called
by transactions, to over-approximate the set of read and written
keys. We then check a simple condition on these approximations
(Definition 9), which ensures that the transactions can be swapped.
Since static analyses to over-approximate read and written vari-
ables are quite standard [31], here we just rely on such analyses,
by only requiring their correctness. We define below when a set of
qualified keys P is a safe approximation of the keys read/written
by T. Intuitively, Definition 7 says that a set P safely approximates
the keys written by T when T does not alter the state of the keys
not in P . Instead, P safely approximates the keys read by T when,
given two blockchains B and B′, if BT and B′T differ on some key,
but B and B′ agree on that key, then B and B′ must differ on some
keys in P .
Definition 7 (Safe approximation of read/writtenkeys). Given
a set of qualified keys P and a transaction T, we define:
P |=w T iff ∀Q : Q ∩ P = ∅ =⇒ T ∼Q ϵ
P |=r T iff ∀B,B′,Q : B ∼P B′ ∧ B ∼Q B′ =⇒ BT ∼Q B′T
Example 8. Let T = A 1−→ C : f(), where f(){B$1} is a procedure
ofC. The execution of T affects the balance ofA,B andC; however,
C.balance is first incremented and then decremented, and so its
value remains unchanged. Then, {A.balance,B.balance} |=w T,
and it is the smallest safe approximation of the keys written by T.
To prove that P = {A.balance} |=r T, assume two blockchains B
and B′ and a set of keys Q such that B ∼P B′ and B ∼Q B′. IfJBKAbalance < 1, then by [Tx2] we have JBTK = JBK. Since B ∼P
B′ and B ∼Q B′, then also JB′KAbalance < 1, and so by [Tx2] we
have JB′TK = JB′K. Then,BT ∼P B′T andBT ∼Q B′T. Otherwise,
if JBKAbalance = n ≥ 1, then by [Tx1] the execution of T transfers
one unit of currency from A to B. So JBTKAbalance = n − 1, and
since B ∼P B′ and B ∼Q B′ hold, we have that JB′TKAbalance =
n − 1. Therefore, we conclude that P |=r T.
The following item states that widening a safe approximation
(either of read or written keys) preserves its safety. Further, the
intersection of two safe write approximations is still safe. From this,
it follows that there exists a least safe approximation of the keys
written by a transaction.
Lemma 5. Let • ∈ {r ,w}. Then:
(a) if P |=• T and P ⊆ P ′, then P ′ |=• T;
(b) if P |=w T and Q |=w T, then P ∩Q |=w T.
The following example shows that part (b) of Lemma 5 does not
hold for read approximations.
Example 9. Let C be a contract with exactly two procedures:
f(x ) {k :=x ;k ′:=x}
g() {if?k , A thenB$?balance else skip}
and let T = A 0−→ C : g(). Note that, in any reachable state σ , it
must be σCk = σCk ′. LetQ be such that B ∼Q B′, and let σ = JBK,
σ ′ = JB′K, n = σCbalance, and n′ = σ ′Cbalance. Appending T
to B and B′ will result in:
JTKσ = {σ − C : n +B : n if σCk , A
σ otherwise
JTKσ ′ = {σ ′ − C : n′ +B : n′ if σ ′Ck , A
σ ′ otherwise
If B ∼{k } B′, then the conditions σCk , A and σ ′Ck , A are
equivalent. Therefore, JBTK = JTKσ ∼Q JTKσ ′ = JB′TK, and so we
have proved that {k} |=r T. Similarly, we obtain that {k ′} |=r T,
since k and k ′ are always bound to the same value. Note however
that {k}∩{k ′} = ∅ is not a safe approximation of the keys read by T.
For instance, if σCk = A , σ ′Ck ′ and σCbalance = σ ′Cbalance,
then appending T to B or to B′ results in states which differ on the
balance of C.
Strong swappability We now show how safe approximations of
the read/written keys can be used to detect when two transactions
are swappable. We define a static analysis that checks whether
the two transactions T and T′ operate on disjoint portions of the
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blockchain state. To achieve that, we recast in our setting Bern-
stein’s conditions [9] for the parallel execution of processes: it
suffices to check that the set of keys written by T is disjoint from
those written or read by T′, and vice versa. When this happens we
say that the two transactions are strongly swappable.
Definition 8 (Strong swappability). We say that two transac-
tions T , T′ are strongly swappable, in symbols T#T′, when there
exist Pw , P ′w , Pr , P ′r such that Pw |=w T, P ′w |=w T′, Pr |=r T,
P ′r |=r T′, and:(
Pr ∪ Pw
) ∩ P ′w = ∅ = (P ′r ∪ P ′w ) ∩ Pw (1)
Example 10. Consider two contract addresses C1 and C2 that,
respectively, are associated with the following procedures:
f1(){skip} f2(x){x$value}
and consider the following transactions:
T1 = A
1−→ C1 : f1() T2 = B 1−→ C2 : f2(F)
where A, B, and F are account addresses. To prove that T1#T2,
consider the following safe approximations of the written/read
keys of T1 and T2, respectively:
W1 = {A.balance,C1.balance} |=w T1 R1 = {A.balance} |=r T1
W2 = {B.balance,F .balance} |=w T2 R2 = {B.balance} |=r T2
Since (W1 ∪ R1) ∩W2 = ∅ = (W2 ∪ R2) ∩W1, the two transactions
are strongly swappable. Now, let:
T3 = B
1−→ C2 : f2(A)
and the following safe approximationsW3 and R3:
W3 = {B.balance,A.balance} |=w T3
R3 = {B.balance} |=r T3
SinceW1 ∩W3 , ∅ ,W2 ∩W3, then neither T1, T3 nor T2, T3 are
strongly swappable.
Example 11 (Lottery, revised). Recall TinyLottery from Exam-
ple 4, and consider the following transactions:
Tr1 = A
0−→ TinyLottery : reveal(v1)
Tr2 = B
0−→ TinyLottery : reveal(v2)
where A , B. It does not hold that Tr1#Tr2: indeed, by inspect-
ing the reveal procedure we see that any P such that P |=w Tr1
or P |=w Tr2 must contain TinyLottery.balance, s1 and s2. Fig-
ure 6 shows a slightly modified lottery, where reveal transactions
are strongly swappable. Assume now that Tr1 and Tr2 operate
on TinyLottery2, and define the following sets of keys, where
C = TinyLottery2:
P1w = {C.sA,C.rA} |=w Tr1
P1r = {C.nPlayers,C.p1,C.p2,C.hA,C.sA} |=r Tr1
P2w = {C.sB,C.rB} |=w Tr2
P2r = {C.nPlayers,C.p1,C.p2,C.hB,C.sB} |=r Tr2
Since the above sets are safe approximations, and (P1w ∪P1r ) ∩P2w =
∅ = (P2w ∪ P2r ) ∩ P1w , we conclude that Tr1#Tr2.
1 contract TinyLottery2
2 {
3 join(h) {
4 if (?nPlayers = 2 || value != 3) then throw
5 else if ?nPlayers = undef
6 then { p1 := sender; "h"^sender := h; nPlayers := 1; t0 :=
Clock:time+1000 }
7 else if (h = ?("h"^?p1)) then throw
8 else p2 := sender; "h"^sender := h; nPlayers := 2
9 }
10 leave() {
11 if (sender = ?p1 && ?nPlayers = 1 && Clock:time > t0)
12 then ?p1 $ ?balance; nPlayers := undef; "s"^sender := undef
13 else throw
14 }
15 reveal(s) {
16 if (?nPlayers != 2) then throw
17 else if (sender = ?p1 && hash(s) = ?("h"^sender)
18 && ?("s"^sender) = undef)
19 then "s"^sender := s; "r"^sender := true
20 else if (sender = ?p2 && hash(s) = ?("h"^sender) && ?("s"^
sender) = undef)
21 then "s"^sender := s; "r"^sender := true
22 else throw
23 }
24 withdrawDeposit(){
25 if ?("r"^sender) = true then "r"^sender = false;sender $ 2
26 else throw
27 }
28 win() {
29 if (?("s"^?p1) != undef && ?("s"^?p2) != undef)
30 then if ((?s1 + ?s2) %2 = 0) then ?p1 $ 2 else ?p2 $ 2
31 else if (?s1 != undef && Clock:time > t0) then ?p1 $ 2
32 else if (?s2 != undef && Clock:time > t0) then ?p2 $ 2
33 else throw
34 }
35 }
Figure 6: A variant of the lottery contract. We use strings as
keys, and we use the operator ˆ to concatenate strings. Ad-
dresses are implicitly treated as strings when needed.
The following theorem ensures the soundness of our static analy-
sis, i.e. that whether two transactions are strongly swappable, then
they are also swappable.
Theorem 6. T#T′ =⇒ T ⇄ T′.
The converse implication of Theorem 6 does not hold, as wit-
nessed by the following example.
Example 12 (Swappable transactions, not strongly). Let C be the
address of a contract with the following procedures:
f1(){if sender = A&&?k1 = 0 thenk1:=1 else throw}
f2(){if sender = B&&?k2 = 0 thenk2:=1 else throw}
and consider the following transactions:
T1 = A
1−→ C : f1() T2 = B 1−→ C : f2()
To prove that T1 ⇄ T2 we have two cases. First, consider a state
σ such that σAbalance > 1, σBbalance > 1, σCbalance = n,
σCk1 = 0 and σCk2 = 0. We have that:JT1T2Kσ = σ{1/C .k1, 1/C .k2, n+2/C .balance} = JT2T1Kσ
In the second case, let σ be such that σAbalance < 1, or
σBbalance < 1, or σCk1 , 0, or σCk2 , 0. It is not possible
that the guards in f1 and f2 are both true, so T1 or T2 raise an
exception, leaving the state unaffected. Then, also in this case we
have that JT1T2Kσ = JT2T1Kσ , and so T1 and T2 are swappable.
However, they are not strongly swappable if there exist reach-
able states σ,σ ′ such that σCk1 = 0 = σ ′Ck2. To see why, let
W1 = {A.balance,C.balance,C.k1}. From the code of f0 we see
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thatW1 is the least safe over-approximation of thewritten keys of T1
(W1 |=w T1). This means that every safe approximation of T1 must
include the keys ofW1. Similarly,W2 = {B.balance,C.balance,C.k2}
is the least safe over-approximation of the written keys of T2
(W2 |=w T2). Since the least safe approximations of the keys written
by T1 and T2 are not disjoint, T1#T2 does not hold.
Theorem 7 states that theMazurkiewicz equivalence≃# is stricter
than≃⇄. Together with Theorem 3, this implies that if a blockchain
B is transformed into B′ by exchanging adjacent strongly swap-
pable transactions, then B and B′ are observationally equivalent.
Theorem 7. ≃# ⊆ ≃⇄.
Note that Definition 8 requires to check the existence of safe
approximations which satisfy the disjointness condition (1). How-
ever, the Turing-equivalence of TinySol implies that finding such
approximations is not always computable, and so:
Proposition 8. The relation # is undecidable.
Parameterised strong swappability Definition 8 establishes
that two transactions are strongly swappable, independently of
a specific static analysis used to obtain the safe approximations
of read/written keys: it is sufficient that such an analysis exists.
Assuming we fix such static analyses, we can parameterise strong
swappability over them. To this purpose, we represent a static
analysis as a function from transactions to sets of qualified keys,
requiring it to be a safe approximation. Formally, we say thatW is a
static analysis of written keys whenW (T) |=w T, for all T; similarly,
R is a static analysis of read keys when R(T) |=r T, for all T.
Definition 9 (Parameterised strong swappability). LetW and
R be static analyses of written/read keys. We say that T, T′ are
strongly swappable w.r.t.W and R, in symbols T#WR T
′, if:(
R(T) ∪W (T)) ∩W (T′) = ∅ = (R(T′) ∪W (T′)) ∩W (T)
Note that an effective procedure for computingW and R gives
an effective procedure to determine whether two transactions are
(strongly) swappable.
Lemma 9. For all static analysesW and R: (i) #WR ⊆ #. (ii) ifW and
R are computable, then #WR is decidable.
From the inclusion in item (i) of Lemma 9 and from Theorem 7
we obtain the following:
Theorem 10. ≃#WR ⊆ ≃# ⊆ ≃⇄.
5 TRUE CONCURRENCY FOR BLOCKCHAINS
In this section we develop a true concurrent model of transac-
tions execution, and we show how to exploit it to improve the
performance of miners and validators. The underlying idea is to
transform a block of transactions into an occurrence net, a classic
true-concurrent model of computation [33]. To this purpose, this
transformation exploits a swappability relation, like e.g. the pa-
rameterised strong swappability #WR introduced in Section 4. The
obtained occurrence net describes exactly the partial order induced
by the swappability relation: any concurrent execution which re-
spects this partial order is guaranteed to be equivalent to the serial
execution of the block (Theorem 13). We then show how miners
and validators can exploit this result to concurrently execute trans-
actions, using the multi-core architecture available on their nodes.
From blockchains to occurrence nets We now introduce our
transformation from blocks of transactions to occurrence nets. We
start by recapping the notion of Petri net [33]. A Petri net is a tuple
N = (P, Tr, F,m0), where P is a set of places, Tr is a set of transitions
(with P∩Tr = ∅), and F : (P×Tr)∪(Tr×P) → N is a weight function.
The state of a net is given by a marking, i.e. a multiset m : P→ N
defining how many tokens are contained in each place; we denote
with m0 the initial marking.
The behaviour of a Petri net is specified as a transition relation
between markings: intuitively, a transition t is enabled at m when
each place p has at least F(p, t) tokens in m. When an enabled
transition t is fired, it consumes F(p, t) tokens from each p, and
produces F(t, p′) tokens in each p′. Formally, given x ∈ P ∪ Tr, we
define the preset •x and the postset x• as multisets: •x(y) = F(y,x),
and x•(y) = F(x ,y). A transition t is enabled at m when •t ⊆ m.
The transition relation between markings is defined as m
t−→ m′,
where t is enabled and m′ = m − •t + t•. We say that t1 · · · tn is a
firing sequence from m to m′ when m t1−→ · · · tn−→ m′. A marking
m′ is reachable from m when there exists a firing sequence from m
to m′; we say that m′ is reachable when it is reachable from m0.
We also recap two special cases of Petri nets. A safe net is a Petri
net where each reachable marking is a set, i.e. m(p) ≤ 1 for all
reachable markings m and for all places p. An occurrence net is a
safe net enjoying the following additional conditions: (i) •t , ∅ and
|t• | = 1, for all t; (ii) |p• | ≤ 1 for all p; (iii) |•p | = 1 if p < m0, and
|•p | = 0 if p ∈ m0; (iv) F∗ is a partial order. Note that the first three
conditions imply that F is a relation, and that the last condition
additionally imposes that it is acyclic.
In Definition 10 we transform a blockchain B = T1 · · · Tn into a
Petri net NR(B), where R is an arbitrary relation between transac-
tions. Although any relationR ensures thatNR(B) is an occurrence
net (Lemma 11), our main results hold when R is a strong swap-
pability relation. The transformation works as follows: the i-th
transaction in B is rendered as a transition (Ti , i) in NR(B), and
transactions related by R are transformed into concurrent tran-
sitions. Technically, this concurrency is specified as a relation <
between transitions, such that (Ti , i) < (Tj , j) whenever i < j, but
Ti and Tj are not related by R. The places, the weight function, and
the initial marking of NR(B) are chosen to ensure that the firing
ot transitions respects the relation <.
Definition 10 (Fromblockchains to Petri nets). LetB = T1 · · · Tn ,
and let R be a binary relation between transactions. We define the
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(∗, tf )
(∗, th )
(∗, tg )
(tf , ∗)
(th , ∗)
(tg , ∗)(tf , tg )
tf
th
tg
Figure 7: Occurrence net for Example 13.
Petri net NR(B) = (P, Tr, F,m0) as follows:
Tr = {(Ti , i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
P = {(∗, t) | t ∈ Tr} ∪ {(t, ∗) | t ∈ Tr} ∪ {(t, t′)  t < t′}
where (T, i) < (T′, j) ≜ (i < j) ∧ ¬(T R T′)
F(x ,y) =

1 if y = t and
(
x = (∗, t) or x = (t′, t))
1 if x = t and
(
y = (t, ∗) or y = (t, t′))
0 otherwise
m0(p) =
{
1 if p = (∗, t)
0 otherwise
Example 13. Consider the following transactions:
Tf = A
0−→ C : f() f() {if?x = 0 theny :=1 else throw}
Tg = A
0−→ C : g() g() {if?y = 0 thenx :=1 else throw}
Th = A
0−→ C : h() h() {z :=1}
Let Pw
f
= Prg = {C.y}, Prf = Pwg = {C.x }, Pwh = {C.z}, Prh = ∅.
Then:
Pw
f
|=w Tf Pwg |=w Tg Pwh |=w Th
Pr
f
|=r Tf Pwg |=r Tg Prg |=r Tg
These sets are safe approximations of their respective transactions
(actually, if there are reachable states σ,σ ′ such that σCx = 0 =
σ ′Cy , they are the least ones). By Definition 8, we have that:
¬(Tf#Tg ) Tf#Th Tg#Th
Let B = TfThTg . We display N# (B) in Figure 7, where tf = (Tf , 1),
th = (Th , 2), and tg = (Tg , 3). Note that tg can only be fired after tf ,
while th can be fired independently from tf and tg . This is coherent
with the fact that Th is swappable with both Tf and Tg , while Tf
and Tg are not swappable.
The construction in Definition 10 ensures that the obtained Petri
net is always an occurrence net:
Lemma 11. NR(B) is an occurrence net, for all R and B.
Step firing sequences Our main result (Theorem 13) establishes
a correspondence between the concurrent and the serial execution
of transactions. Since the semantics of serial executions is given
in terms of blockchain states σ , to formalise this correspondence
it is useful to use the same semantics domain also for concurrent
executions. This is obtained in two steps. First, we define concurrent
executions of B as the step firing sequences (i.e. finite sequences of
sets of transitions) of the occurrence net N# (B). Then, we give a
semantics to step firing sequences, in terms of blockchain states.
We denote finite sets of transitions, called steps, as U,U′ , . . ..
Their preset and postset are defined as follows: •U = ∑p∈U •p and
U• = ∑p∈U p•. We say that U is enabled at m when •U ≤ m, and
in this case firing U results in the move m
U−→ m − •U + U•. Let
U = U1 · · ·Un be a finite sequence of steps. We say that U is a step
firing sequence from m to m′ if m U1−−→ · · · Un−−→ m′, and in this case
we write m
U−→ m′.
Concurrent execution of transactions We now define how to
execute transactions in parallel. We will then exploit this notion
in order to associate step firing sequences with state updates of
the blockchain. Intuitively, transactions are executed in isolation,
ideally on different cores. Updates of the store are recorded, but not
propagated to other transactions (similarly to Fabric). Then, if the
changes are mutually disjoint, they are merged. Note that we can
always represent the state σ ′ = JTKσ as the application of an up-
date π to σ . An update collector is a function Π taking a state σ and
a transaction T, and returning an update π = Π(σ, T) which maps
(at least) the updated qualified keys to their new values. In practice,
an update collector can be obtained by instrumenting the run-time
environment of smart contracts, so to record the differences created
in the blockchain state by the execution of transactions. Our for-
malization of update collectors abstracts from the implementation
details of such an instrumentation:
Definition 11 (Update collector). We say that a function Π is an
update collector when ∀σ, T : JTKσ = σ(Π(σ, T)).
There exists a natural ordering of collectors, which extends the
ordering between state updates (i.e., set inclusion, when interpret-
ing them as sets of substitutions): namely, Π ⊑ Π′ holds when
∀σ, T : Π(σ, T) ⊆ Π′(σ, T). The following lemma characterizes the
least update collector w.r.t. this ordering.
Lemma 12 (Least update collector). Let Π⋆(σ, T) = JTKσ − σ ,
where σ ′ − σ = ⋃σ ′p,σp {σ ′p/p}. Π⋆ is the least update collector.
The merge of two state updates is the union of the corresponding
substitutions; to avoid collisions, we make the operator undefined
when the domains of the two updates overlap.
Definition 12 (Merge of state updates). Let π0, π1 be state up-
dates. When keys(π0) ∩ keys(π1) = ∅, we define π0 ⊕ π1 as follows:
(π0 ⊕ π1)p =

π0p if p ∈ keys(π0)
π1p if p ∈ keys(π1)
⊥ otherwise
The merge operator enjoys the commutative monoidal laws, and
can therefore be extended to (finite) sets of state updates.
The semantics of a stepU = {(T1, 1), . . . , (Tn ,n)} inσ is obtained
by applying to σ the merge of the updates Π(σ, Ti ), for all i ∈ 1..n
— whenever the merge is defined. The semantics of a step firing
sequence is then obtained by folding that of its steps.
A true concurrent model of smart contracts executions
Definition 13 (Semantics of step firing sequences). Let U be
a step of NR(B). We define the semantics of U, for a given update
collector Π and blockchain state σ , as follows:JUKΠσ = σ ⊕
(T,i)∈U
Π(σ, T)
and we extend the semantics to step firing sequences as follows:JϵKΠσ = σ JUUKΠσ = JUKΠσ ′ where σ ′ = JUKΠσ
Example 14. Let tf , tg , and th be as in Example 13, and let σ be
such that σCx = σCy = 0. Since Π⋆(σ, Tf ) = {1/C .y}, Π⋆(σ, Tg ) =
{1/C .x}, and Π⋆(σ, Th ) = {1/C .z}, we have:J{tf , th }KΠ⋆σ = σ({1/C .y} ⊕ {1/C .z}) = σ{1/C .y, 1/C .z}J{tg , th }KΠ⋆σ = σ({1/C .x} ⊕ {1/C .z}) = σ{1/C .x , 1/C .z}J{tf , tg }KΠ⋆σ = (σ{1/C .y} ⊕ {1/C .x}) = σ{1/C .y, 1/C .x}
Note that, for all σ :JTfThKσ = JThTfKσ = σ{1/C .y, 1/C .z} = J{tf , th }KΠ⋆σJTgThKσ = JThTgKσ = σ{1/C .x , 1/C .z} = J{tg , th }KΠ⋆σ
In other words, the serial execution of Tf and Th (in both orders)
is equal to their concurrent execution, and similarly for Tg and Th .
Instead, for all σ such that σCx = σCy = 0:JTfTgKσ = σ{1/C .y} JTgTfKσ = σ{1/C .x}J{tf , tg }KΠ⋆σ = σ{1/C .y, 1/C .x}
So, the concurrent execution of Tf and Tg may differ from serial
executions (in any order). This is coherent with the fact that, in the
occurrence net in Figure 7, transitions tf and tg are not concurrent.
Concurrent execution of blockchains We now establish our
main result (Theorem 13), which relates serial executions of transac-
tions to concurrent ones. Concurrent execution are rendered as step
firing sequences. Item (a) establishes a confluence property: if two
step firing sequences lead to the same marking, then they also lead
to the same blockchain state. Item (b) states that the blockchain,
interpreted as a sequence of transitions, is a step firing sequence,
and it is maximal (i.e., its transitions include all the transitions of
the net). Finally, item (c) ensures that executing maximal step firing
sequences is equivalent to executing serially the blockchain.
Theorem 13. Let B = T1 · · · Tn . Then, in N# (B):
(a) if U and U′ are step firing sequences from m0 to m, thenJUKΠ⋆σ = JU′KΠ⋆σ , for all reachable σ .
(b) {(T1, 1)} · · · {(Tn ,n)} is a maximal step firing sequence;
(c) for all maximal step firing sequences U, and for all reachable
σ , JUKΠ⋆σ = JBKσ .
Note that, since #WR ⊆ # holds by Lemma 9, then the implications
of Theorem 13 also apply to N#WR (B).
Example 15. Recall B = TfThTg and N# (B) from Example 13,
let U = {tf , th }{tg }, and let σ be such that σCx = σCy = 0. As
predicted by item (c) of Theorem 13, we have that:JBKσ = σ{1/C .y}{1/C .z} = JUKΠ⋆σ
Now, let U′ = {tf }{tg , th }. We have that U and U′ lead to the
same marking, where the places (tf , ∗), (tg , ∗) and (th , ∗) contain
tj1 tj2
tr1
tr2
tw
Figure 8: Occurrence net for Example 16.
one token each, while the other places have no tokens. By item (a)
of Theorem 13 we conclude that JUKΠ⋆σ = JU′KΠ⋆σ .
Example 16 (Lottery, revised). Recall Tr1 and Tr2 of TinyLottery2
from Example 11. Let B = Tj1Tj2Tr1Tr2Tw, where:
Tj1 = A
3−→ TinyLottery2 : join(h1) h1 = hash(v1)
Tj2 = B
3−→ TinyLottery2 : join(h2) h2 = hash(v2)
Tw = B
0−→ TinyLottery2 : win()
Since Tr1#Tr2, the occurrence net N# (B) is the one in Figure 8. Let
U = {Tj1}{Tj2}{Tr1, Tr2}{Tw}, i.e. Tr1 and Tr2 are executed con-
currently. From item (c) of Theorem 13 we have that this concurrent
execution is equivalent to the serial execution of B.
Exploiting our results in practice We now discuss how to ap-
ply Theorem 13 to improve the performances of both miners and
validators in Ethereum. Miners perform the following steps to mine
a block (we omit the proof-of-work, since it is independent from
our optimization):
(1) gather from the network a set of transactions, and put them in
an arbitrary linear order B, which is the mined block;
(2) compute the relation #WR on B, using a suitable static analysis
for read/written keys;
(3) construct the occurrence net N#WR (B);
(4) execute transactions concurrently according to the occurrence
net, exploiting the available parallelism.
Note that in the concrete setting, the static analysis of item (2)
should be applied to the new contracts that have been published in
B. Although in our calculus we have omitted dynamic creation of
contracts, our results still apply to this case. Indeed, the static anal-
ysis does not need to inspect the Solidity code of the contract, but
it just needs the EVM code, which is published on the blockchain.
The behaviour of validators is almost identical to that of miners,
except that in step (1), rather than choosing the order of transaction,
they adhere to the ordering of the mined block B (further, they do
not perform the proof-of-work). Note that in the last step, validators
can execute any maximal step firing sequence which is coherent
with their degree of parallelism: item (c) of Theorem 13 ensures
that the resulting state is equal to the state obtained by the miner.
A key difference between our approach and [6, 18] is that in our
case miners only need to write transactions on the blockchain (as
in the actual Ethereum), while in [6, 18] they also need to embed
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the dependencies graph, which is essential to ensure that validators
can reconstruct the same schedule of transactions. Therefore, our
approach is compatible with the current Ethereum, while [6, 18]
would require a soft-fork.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a static approach to improve the performance
of Ethereum nodes by concurrently executing transactions. We
start by introducing TinySol, a core contract calculus inspired by
Solidity. After formalizing its semantics, we define the sequential
semantics of a blockchain as a function which maps each contract
to its state. Based upon this semantics, we characterise swappable
transactions: two adjacent transactions are such when inverting
their order does not affect the state of the blockchain. Since swappa-
bility is undecidable, we introduce a stricter relation, called strong
swappability, which just relies on static approximations of the sets
of keys read/written by transactions. We build upon this notion
to study when transactions can be executed concurrently. To this
purpose, we introduce a translation from blocks of transactions to
occurrence nets, a classic model of true concurrency. Concurrent
executions of a block of transactions are rendered as step firing
sequences in the associated occurrence net. Our main technical
result, Theorem 13, shows that these concurrent executions are
semantically equivalent to the sequential execution. We discuss
how this result can be exploited in practice to optimize Ethereum
miners and validators. Compared to other approaches proposed in
literature, ours has the benefit of being compatible with the current
implementation of Ethereum, without requiring (soft or hard) forks.
ComparingTinySol and Solidity Aiming atminimality, TinySol
makes some simplifications with respect to Solidity. A first differ-
ence is that our model assumes the set of contracts to be fixed,
while in Ethereum new contracts can be created at run-time. Users
create contracts by publishing special transactions, which specify
the EVM code of the contract procedures. As noted in Section 5,
this difference does not affect the applicability of our optimization
technique, since miners and validators are supposed to statically
analyse the EVM code of the new contracts found in each block.
A second difference is that Ethereum features a “gas” mecha-
nism to ensure that all procedure calls terminate. When sending a
transaction, users deposit into it some cryptocurrency, to be paid to
the miner which appends the transaction to the blockchain. Each
computation step performed by the miner consumes part of this
deposit; when the deposit reaches zero, the miner stops executing
the transaction. At this point, all the effects of the transaction (ex-
cept the payment to the miner) are rolled back. For simplicity, in
TinySol we do not model the gas mechanism: we just ensure that
non-terminating calls have an undefined semantics, so that they
are rolled back by rule [Tx2]. We stress that the gas mechanism does
not affect our optimization technique: since “out-of-gas” exceptions
roll back the transaction and transfer some currency to a miner, it
suffices to ensure that static analyses of read/written keys always
include the balance of the caller.
Two minor differences between TinySol and Solidity concern
time constraints and fallback procedures. In Ethereum, contracts
can implement time constraints by using the block publication
time, accessible via the variable block.timestamp. In TinySol
we do not record timestamps in the blockchain; still, contracts
can implement time constraints by using oracles, like e.g. Clock
within TinyLottery. Our optimization technique can deal with
time constraints: it is enough to assume that the first transaction in a
block is that of an oracle who writes the key block.timestamp.
Finally, Solidity contracts have a fallback procedure, i.e. an unnamed
procedure with no arguments, which is implicitly invoked when
the procedure name specified in the transaction does not match any
of the procedures in the contract. Although we do not model this
feature in TinySol, static analyses of read/written keys can easily
approximate its behaviour.
Future works As a future work we plan to perform an experi-
mental assessment of our technique on the Ethereum blockchain,
by implementing a static analysis of EVM bytecode. A first goal of
this evaluation will be to detect strongly swappable transactions,
and measure their occurrence, so to give a hint on the impact of
parallelization of transactions. A second goal is to implement our
parallelization technique in an Ethereum node, and to evaluate
its effectiveness. In particular, we aim at estimating if the (small)
overhead introduced in nodes is compensated by a gain in terms
of throughput. The experiments in [18] already suggest that paral-
lelization may lead to a significant improvement of the performance
of nodes: their benchmarks on a selection of representative con-
tracts show an overall speedups of 1.33x for miners and 1.69x for
validators, using only three cores. A relevant line of research is
to study program transformations to increase the degree of con-
currency. For instance, we have seen in Example 16 that a simple
transformation of our TinyLottery is enough to parallelize some
of its procedures. Generalising this approach would lead to fur-
ther improvements of the efficiency of Ethereum. Domain-specific
languages designed to foster parallelization of the procedures in a
contract would be another tool to reach this goal.
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1 contract TinyEscrow
2 {
3 init(x,y) {
4 if ?buyer != undef then throw
5 else buyer := sender; seller := x; oracle := y
6 }
7 pay() {
8 if sender != ?buyer then throw
9 else ?seller $ ?balance
10 }
11 refund() {
12 if sender != ?seller then throw
13 else ?buyer $ ?balance
14 }
15 dispute() {
16 if (sender != ?buyer && sender != ?seller)
17 then throw
18 else ?oracle.openDispute()
19 }
20 }
21
22 contract Oracle
23 {
24 openDispute() {
25 if ?escrow = undef then escrow := sender
26 }
27 closeDispute(z) {
28 if (sender != AOracle) then throw
29 else {
30 fee := ?escrow:?balance * 0.01;
31 ?escrow:?buyer $ (?escrow:?balance - ?fee) * z;
32 ?escrow:?seller $ ?escrow:?balance;
33 ?fee $ AOracle;
34 escrow := undef
35 }
36 }
37 }
Figure 9: An escrow contract using an oracle.
A ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES
In this appendix we illustrate the expressiveness of TinySol through
a series of examples.
An escrow contract In Figure 9 we program a simple escrow
contract, which allows a buyer to deposit some funds to the contract
and later authorize their transfer to a seller. Further, the seller
can authorize a full refund to the buyer, in case there is some
problem with the purchase. If buyer and seller do not find an
agreement, they can resort to an external authority, which decides
how the initial deposit is split among them (retaining a fee).
The procedure init initializes three keys: buyer (the sender of
the transaction), seller and oracle (passed as parameters). The
guard ensures that init can be called at most once. The procedures
pay and refund authorize, respectively, the fund transfer to the
seller or to the buyer; their guards ensure that a participant can-
not authorize a transfer to herself. Either buyer and seller can call
dispute, which in turns calls the procedure openDispute of the
contract at address oracle. A possible contract with this procedure
is Oracle in Figure 9: there, openDispute just bounds the key
escrow to the address of the contract caller (TinyEscrow). The
oracle resolves the dispute by calling the procedure closeDispute:
its parameter z is the fraction of the deposit which goes to the buyer;
1% of the deposit goes to the oracle as fee. Note that, if buyer or
seller call pay or refund before the oracle calls closeDispute,
then the latter invocation just results in a reset of the key escrow.
A Ponzi scheme In Figure 10 we implement a Ponzi scheme, i.e.
a contract where users invest money, and can redeem their invest-
ment (plus interests) if enough users invest enough money in the
1 contract TinyPonzi
2 {
3 init() {
4 if ?owner != undef then throw
5 else { owner := sender;
6 n := 0; // total number of investors
7 p := 0 // number of paid investors
8 }
9 }
10 join() {
11 if (?value < 1 || ?owner = undef) then throw
12 else {
13 ?n := (sender,value);
14 n := ?n + 1;
15 value/10 $ ?owner;
16 while (?p < ?n && ?balance >= 2*snd(??p)) do {
17 2*snd(??p) $ fst(??p);
18 p := ?p + 1
19 }
20 }
21 }
22 }
Figure 10: A Ponzi scheme.
1 contract TinyWallet {
2 init() {
3 if ?owner = undef then owner := sender else throw
4 }
5
6 pay(amount,dst) {
7 if (sender!=?owner || value!=0 || amount>?balance)
8 then throw
9 else {
10 if ?dst = undef then ?dst := amount
11 else ?dst := ?dst + amount;
12 dst $ amount
13 }
14 }
15 }
Figure 11: An extended wallet contract.
contract afterwards. In particular, we consider a scheme which pays
back users in order of arrival; this kind of Ponzi schemes gained
some popularity in the early stage of Ethereum, with many dozens
of different instances [8].
The procedure init sets the contract owner, and initializes to
0 the key n, which counts the total number of investors, and p,
which counts the number of investors who have been paid. The
procedure join allows users to invest money, and distributes the
new investment among all the other users who have not been paid
so far. The procedure exploits the key-value store to maintain an
array of investors. At line 14, the key ?n (i.e., the current value of
n) is bound to a pair, which contains the address of the new investor,
and the invested amount. We use fst and snd to access the first
and second element of a pair, respectively. When a new user joins
the scheme, the owner receives 1/10 of the value transferred along
with the call (line 16). At lines 17-19, the procedure scans the
array of unpaid users, starting from the oldest entry. As long as
the balance is enough, each user receives twice the amount she
invested. Note that?p denotes the value bound to p (i.e., the index of
the first unpaid user), while ??p denotes the pair (sender, value)
associated to that user.
An extended wallet In Figure 11 we refine the wallet contract
in Example 1. The contract TinyWallet has two procedures:
init, which initializes the contract owner, and pay, which transfers
amount units of currency from the contract to the account dst. At
line 2, the procedure checks if the key owner is defined; if not, it
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means that the contract is still in the initial state where all keys
(except balance) are undefined, and in this case it binds the key
owner to the sender of the transaction. At line 5, the procedure
aborts if the caller is not the contract owner, or if the caller transfers
some currency along with the call, or if the contract balance is not
enough. At line 7, if the key ?dst is not bound yet, then it is set to
amount. Otherwise, at line 8 the old value is incremented of amount.
Finally, line 9 transfers amount units of currency to the recipient.
B PROOFS
Lemma 1. For all P ⊆ P: (i) ∼P is an equivalence relation; (ii) if
σ ∼P σ ′ and Q ⊆ P , then σ ∼Q σ ′; (iii) ∼=∼P.
Proof. Items (i) and (ii) are trivial. The inclusion∼P ⊆ ∼ is trivial,
and ∼ ⊆ ∼P, follows from item (ii). □
Lemma 2. B ∼ B′ =⇒ ∀B0,B1 : B0BB1 ∼ B0B′B1.
Proof. Straightforward from the fact that semantics of state-
ments in Figure 2 is a function, and it only depends on the blockchain
states after the execution of B and B′, which are equal in any σ
since B ∼ B′. □
Theorem 3. ≃⇄ ⊆ ∼.
Proof. By definition,≃⇄ is the least equivalence relation closed
under the rules:
ϵ ≃⇄ ϵ
[≃0]
T ≃⇄ T
[≃1]
T ⇄ T′
TT′ ≃⇄ T′T
[≃2]
B0 ≃⇄ B′0 B1 ≃⇄ B′1
B0B1 ≃⇄ B′0B′1
[≃3]
Let B ≃⇄ B′. We have to show B ∼ B′. We proceed by induction
on the rules above. The case for rules [≃0] and [≃1] follows by the
fact that ∼ is an equivalence relation (Lemma 1) and hence reflexive.
The case for rule [≃2] follows immediately by Definition 5. For rule
[≃3], first note that B = B0B1 and B′ = B′0B′1. By the induction
hypothesis it follows that:
B0 ∼ B′0 and B1 ∼ B′1
Therefore, by two applications of Lemma 2:
B = B0B1 ∼ B0B′1 ∼ B′0B′1 = B′
□
Lemma 5. Let • ∈ {r ,w}. Then:
(a) if P |=• T and P ⊆ P ′, then P ′ |=• T;
(b) if P |=w T and Q |=w T, then P ∩Q |=w T.
Proof. Item (a). For the case • = w , let P |=w T and P ⊆ P ′. Let
Q be such that Q ∩ P ′ = ∅. We have to show that T ∼Q ϵ . Since
P ⊆ P ′, it must be Q ∩ P = ∅. Then, since P |=w T, it must be
T ∼Q ϵ , as required. For the case • = r , let P |=r T and P ⊆ P ′. We
have to show that, for all B1,B2, if B1 ∼P ′ B2 and B1 ∼Q B2, then
B1T ∼Q B2T. But this follows immediately by the fact that P ⊆ P ′
and P |=r T.
Item (b). Let R be such that R ∩ (P ∩Q ) = ∅. Since P |=w T and
(R \ P) ∩ P = ∅, it must be:
T ∼R\P ϵ
Similarly, since Q |=w T and (R \Q ) ∩Q = ∅, we have that:
T ∼R\Q ϵ
By assumption R ∩ (P ∩ Q ) = ∅, then (R \ P) ∪ (R \ Q ) = R .
By Definition 4, we conclude that:
T ∼R T ∼(R\P)∪(R\Q ) ϵ □
Lemma 14. Let PwT |=w T, PwT′ |=w T′, and PrT |=r T. Then:
PwT′ ∩ PrT = ∅ = PwT ∩ SwT′ =⇒ T ∼PwT T
′T
Proof. Since PwT′ |=w T′ and PwT′ ∩ PwT = ∅, by Definition 7 we
have T′ ∼PwT ϵ . We prove that T′ ∼P rT ϵ . By contradiction, assume
that T′ ≁p ϵ for some p ∈ PrT . Since PwT′ |=w T′, it must be p ∈ PwT′
— contradiction, since PwT′ ∩ PrT = ∅. Since PrT |=r T, by Definition 7
we conclude that T′T ∼PwT T. □
Lemma 15. T1#WR T2 =⇒ T1T2 ∼W (T1) T2T1
Proof. By Definition 9, it must be:
W (T1) ∩W (T2) = ∅
So, sinceW (T2) |=w T2, by Definition 7 we have:
ϵ ∼W (T1) T2
and so, since ∼W (T1) is a congruence:
T1 ∼W (T1) T1T2
By Definition 9, it must be:
W (T2) ∩ R(T1) = ∅ =W (T1) ∩W (T2)
Then, by Lemma 14:
T1 ∼W (T1) T2T1
By simmetry and transitivity of ∼ (Lemma 1), we conclude:
T1T2 ∼W (T1) T2T1 □
Lemma 16. T1#WR T2 =⇒ T1 ⇄ T2
Proof. By applying Lemma 15 twice:
T1T2 ∼W (T1) T2T1 T2T1 ∼W (T2) T1T2
Let P = P \ (W (T1) ∪W (T2)). Since P ∩W (T1) = ∅ = P ∩W (T2),
by applying Definition 7 twice:
ϵ ∼P T1 ϵ ∼P T2
Then, since ∼P is a congruence:
T1T2 ∼P T2T1
Summing up:
T1T2 ∼P∪(W (T1)∪W (T2)) T2T1
from which we obtain the thesis, since ∼P=∼. □
Lemma 17. T1#T2 =⇒ ∃W ,R : T1#WR T2
Proof. Straightforward from Definition 8 and Definition 9. □
Theorem 6. T#T′ =⇒ T ⇄ T′.
Proof. By Lemma 17 and Lemma 16. □
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Lemma 9. For all static analysesW and R: (i) #WR ⊆ #. (ii) ifW and
R are computable, then #WR is decidable.
Proof. Trivial. □
Theorem 7. ≃# ⊆ ≃⇄.
Proof. Straightforward by Theorem 6. □
Lemma 18. B ≃# B′ =⇒ B ∼ B′
Proof. It follows by Theorems 3 and 7. □
Lemma 19. ⊕ is commutative and associative, with λp .⊥ as neutral
element.
Proof. Trivial. □
Lemma 20. If π1 ⊕ π2 = π , then π = π1π2.
Proof. Since π1⊕π2 is defined, it must be keys(π1)∩keys(π2) =
∅. Let p be a qualified key. We have two cases:
• p ∈ keys(π). Since keys(π) = keys(π1) ∪ keys(π2), we have
two subcases:
– p ∈ keys(π1). Then, πp = π1p . By disjointness, p <
keys(π2), and hence π1π2p = π1p .
– p ∈ keys(π2). Then, πp = π2p = π1π2p .
• p < keys(π). Then, p < keys(π1), p < keys(π)[2]. Clearly,
πp = ⊥ = π1π2p .
□
Lemma 21. If B1 ◁ T1 and B2 ◁ T2, then B1B2 ◁ (T1 ∪ T2).
Proof. By induction on |B2 |. For the base case, it must beB2 = ϵ
and hence T2 = ∅. Then, B1B2 = B1 and T1 ∪ T2 = T1. Therefore,
the thesis coincides with the first hypothesis. For the induction
case, it must be B2 = B′2T, with |B′2 | = n. Furthermore, it must be
T2 = {T} ∪T′2, for some T′2 such that B′2 ◁ T′2. By the induction
hypothesis:
B1B′2 ◁ (T1 ∪ T′2)
Then:
B1B′2T = B1B2 ◁ ({T} ∪ T1 ∪ T′2) = T1 ∪ T2
□
Lemma 22. Let B and T be such that B = B1T′B2 =⇒ T#WR T′.
Then, for all B′, JB′K ∼R(T) JBKJB′K and JB′K ∼W (T) JBKJB′K .
Proof. A simple induction on |B |, using Definition 7 for the
induction case. □
Lemma 23. If T#WR T
′ for all T′ ∈ T and B1 ◁ T then, B =
B1T′B2 =⇒ T#WR T′.
Proof. A simple induction on |T |. □
Lemma 24. If p |=r T, B1 ∼p B2 and B1 ∼q B2, then JB1TK ∼qJB1KΠ(JB2K, T).
Proof. Let π1 = Π(JB1K, T) and π2 = Π(JB2K, T). By Defini-
tion 11, JB1TK = JB1Kπ1. Let p ∈ Q . We have two cases:
• p ∈ keys(π2).JB1Kπ2p = π2p = JB2Kπ2p = JB2TKp = JB1TKp
• p < keys(π2).JB1Kπ2p = JB1Kp = JB2Kp = JB2Kπ2p = JB1TKp
□
Definition 14. Let Π be a state updater, and letW be such that
∀T : W (T) |=w T. We say that Π and W are compatible when
∀σ, T : keys(Π(σ, T)) ⊆W (T).
We extend the semantics of transactions (Definition 2) to finite
multisets of transactions. Hereafter, we denote with [] the empty
multiset, with [T1, . . . , Tn ] the multiset containing T1, . . . , Tn , and
with A+B the sum between multisets, i.e. (A+B)(x) = A(x)+B(x)
for all x .
Definition 15 (Semantics of multisets of transactions). We
denote the semantics of a multiset of transactions T, in a state σ
and an update collector Π, as JTKΠσ , where the partial function J·KΠσ
is defined as: JTKΠσ = σ⊕T∈T Π(σ, T).
Hereafter, we say that a multiset T is strongly swappable w.r.t.
#WR if ∀T ∈ T,∀T′ ∈ T \ [T] : T#WR T′.
Lemma 25. If T is strongly swappable w.r.t. #WR , B ◁ T and Π is
compatible withW then, for all B0: JTKΠJB0K = JBKJB0K .
Proof. By induction on |B |. For the base case, it must be B =
ϵ and T = ∅, and hence J∅KΠJB0K = JB0K = JϵKJB0K . For the
induction case, it must be B = B′T, with |B′ | = n. Clearly, T =
{T} ∪ T′ for some T′ such that B′ ◁ T′ . Let Π(JB0K, T) = πT . By
the induction hypothesis:JT′KΠJB0K = JB′KJB0K (2)
Note that: JT′KΠJB0K = JB0Kπ ′ (3)
Where π ′
⊕
T′∈T′ Π(JB0K, T′)). Let Π(JB0K, T) = πT . Since T is
strongly swappable w.r.t. #WR and Π is compatible withW , it must
be keys(π ′) ∩ keys(πT ) = ∅, and hence (π ′ ⊕ πT ) is defined. Then,
it must be:JTKΠJB0K = JB0K(π ′ ⊕ πT )
= JB0Kπ ′πT By lemma 20
= JT′KΠJB0KπT By eq. (3)
= JB′KJB0KπT By eq. (2)
(4)
We have that:JBKJB0K = JB′TKJB0K = JB′KJB0Kπ ′T
Where π ′T = Π(JB′0KJB0K , T). As keys(πT ) ⊆W (T) and keys(πT ) ⊆
W (T), it follows immediately that JB′KJB0KπT ∼p JBKJB0K for all
p < W (T). It remains to show that JB′KJB0KπT ∼W (T) JBKJB0K .
First note that, by Lemmas 22 and 23:JB0K ∼R(T) JB′KJB0K JB0K ∼W (T) JB′KJB0K
Then, by Lemma 24:JB′KJB0KπT ∼W (T) JBKJB0K
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And hence: JB′KJB0KπT = JBKJB0K (5)
The thesis JTKΠJB0K = JBKJB0K follows by eqs. (4) and (5). □
Lemma 26. EveryW is compatible with Π⋆.
Proof. Trivial. □
We now formalize when a blockchain B is a serialization of a
multiset of transactions T.
Definition 16 (Serialization ofmultisets of transactions). We
define the relation ◁ between blockchains and multisets of trans-
actions as follows:
ϵ ◁ []
B ◁ T
BT ◁ ([T] + T)
The following theorem ensures that the parallel execution of
strongly swappable transactions is equivalent to any sequential
execution of them. Hereafter, we say that a multiset T is strongly
swappable if ∀T ∈ T,∀T′ ∈ T − [T] : T#T′.
Theorem 27. If T is strongly swappable and B ◁ T, then, for all
reachable σ : JTKΠ⋆σ = JBKσ .
Proof. Direct by Lemmas 25 and 26. □
A parellelized blockchain B is a finite sequence of multisets of
transactions; we denote with ϵ the empty sequence. We extend the
semantics of multisets (Definition 15) to parallelized blockchains
as follows.
Definition 17 (Semantics of parallelized blockchains). The
semantics of parallelized blockchains is defined as follows:
JϵKΠσ = σ JTBKΠσ = JBKΠJTKΠσ
We write JBKΠ for JBKΠσ⋆ , where σ⋆ is the initial state.
We also extend the serialization relation ◁ (Definition 16) to
parallelized blockchains.
Definition 18 (Serialization of parallelized blockchains). We
define the relation◁ between blockchains and parallelized blockchains
as follows:
ϵ ◁ ϵ
B1 ◁ T B2 ◁ B
B1B2 ◁ TB
The following theorem states that our technique to parallelize
the transactions in a blockchain preserves its semantics.
Theorem28. If eachmultiset inB is strongly swappable andB ◁ B,
then, for all reachable σ : JBKΠ⋆σ = JBKσ .
Proof. By induction on the rule used for deriving B ◁ B.
• Rule:
ϵ ◁ ϵ .
The thesis follows trivially as:
JϵKσ = σ = JϵKΠ⋆σ
• Rule: B1 ◁ T B2 ◁ B
B1B2 ◁ TB
.
By Theorem 27, for some reachable σ ′:
JB1Kσ = σ ′ = JTKΠ⋆σ
By the induction hypothesis:
JB2Kσ ′ = JBKΠ⋆σ ′
The thesis then follows immediately by the following:
JB2Kσ ′ = JB1B2Kσ JBKΠ⋆σ ′ = JTBKΠ⋆σ
□
Lemma 29. Let R be a binary relation between transactions, B =
T1 · · · Tn , andNR(B) = (P, Tr, F,m0). Then (Tr, <∗) is a partial order.
Proof. Transitivity and reflexivity hold by definition. For anti-
symmetricity, assume (Ti , i) <∗ (Tj , j) and (Tj , j) <∗ (Ti , i). Then,
it is easy to verify that i ≤ j and j ≤ i , and so i = j . Since Ti and Tj
are uniquely determined by i and j , we have that Ti = Tj . Therefore,
(Ti , i) = (Tj , j), as required. □
Lemma 11. NR(B) is an occurrence net, for all R and B.
Proof. Items (i),(ii) and (iii) are easy to verify. For item (iv), note
that it suffice to prove that F∗ is acyclic. So, assume, by contradiction,
there is a sequence x = x0,x1, . . . xm such that (xi ,xi+1 ∈ F) for all
0 ≤ i < m, and x0 = xm withm > 0. Note that the above sequence
alternates between transitions and places, and so, sincem > 0 at
least a place and at least a transition occur in x . Furthermore, a
place between two transitions t, t′ can exist only if t < t′. Therefore,
for any two transitions t, t′ occurring in x we have that t <∗ t′
and t′ <∗ t. So, if x contains at least two transitions, by Lemma 29,
we have a contradiction. If only one transition t = (T, i) occurs in
x , then there is a place of the form (t, t) occuring in x . Therefore,
t < t, which implies i < i: contradiction. □
Lemma 30. Let N = (P, Tr, F,m0) be an occurrence net. For all
t, t′ ∈ Tr, if t , t′ then •t ∩ •t′ = ∅.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that p ∈ •t ∩ •t′ with t ,
t′. Then, {t, t′} ⊆ p•, and hence |p• | ≥ 2 — contradiction with
constraint (ii) of the definition of occurrence nets. □
Lemma 31. Let N = (P, Tr, F,m0) be an occurrence net, and let m
be a reachable marking. Then:
(1) If m
t−→ m′ and m t−→ m′′, then m′ = m′′ (determinism).
(2) If m
t−→ m′, m t
′
−→ m′′ and t , t′, then there exists m′′′ such
that m′
t′−→ m′′′ and m′′ t−→ m′′′ (diamond property).
(3) If m
t−→ −→∗ t
′
−→ then t , t′ (linearity).
(4) If m
t−→∗ m then |t | = 0 (acyclicity).
Proof. For Item 1, by definition of the firing of transitions of
Petri Nets it must be: m′ = m − •t + t• = m′′.
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For Item 2, since m
t−→ m′ and m t
′
−→ m′′, it must be:
•t ⊆ m m′ = m − •t + t•
•t′ ⊆ m m′′ = m − •t′ + t′•
By Lemma 30 it follows that t′ is enabled at m′, and t is enabled at
m′′. Then, by definition of firing:
m′
t′−→ m′ − •t′ + t′• and m′′ t−→ m′′ − •t + t•
Then:
m′ − •t′ + t′• = (m − •t + t•) − •t′ + t′•
= (m − •t′ + t′•) − •t + t• (as •t′ ⊆ m)
= m′′ − •t + t•
Hence, the thesis follows by choosing m′′′ = m′ − •t′ + t′•.
Item 3 follows directly by induction on the lenght of the reduction
−→∗, exploiting the fact that F∗ is a partial order.
Item 4 follows by the fact that F∗ is a partial order. □
Lemma 32. Let N = (P, Tr, F,m0) be an occurrence net, and let m
be a reachable marking, such that, for some t, m′, m′′:
m n+1 m′
m′′
t
/t
Then, m′′ −→n m′.
Proof. By induction on n. For the base case, it must be m −→1
m′, and hence m
t′−→ m′ for some t′. Since m t−→ m′′, by the
contrapositive of item 2 of Lemma 31 (diamond property) it follows
t = t′, and so, by item 1 of Lemma 31 (determinism) we have that
m′ = m′′. Clearly:
m′′ −→0 m′
For the induction case, suppose n =m + 1, for somem. Therefore,
for some t′,m′′′:
m
t′−→ m′′′ −→m+1 m′
If t = t′, then by item 1 of Lemma 31 (determinism) it follows that
m′′′ = m′′, and so we have the thesis m′′ −→n m′. Otherwise, if
t , t′, by item 2 of Lemma 31 (diamond property), there must exists
m1 such that:
m′′
t′−→ m1 and m′′′ t−→ m1
We are in the following situation:
m′′′ m+1 m′
m1
t
/t
Sincem + 1 = n, by the induction hypothesis:
m1 −→m m′
Therefore, we have the thesis
m′′
t′−→ m1 −→m m′ □
Lemma 33. Let (T, i), (T′, j) be transitions of N#WR (B), and letm be
a reachable marking. Then:
(T, i) < (T′, j) and m (T,i)−−−→ =⇒ m ̸(T
′, j)−−−−→
Proof. By the construction in Definition 10, since (T, i) < (T′, j),
then p = ((T, i), (T′, j)) is a place of the occurrence net, and F((T, i), p) =
1 and F(p, (T′, j)) = 1. □
Definition 19 (Independency). Let N = (P, Tr, F,m0) be an oc-
currence net. We say that transitions t and t′ are independent, in
symbols t I t′, if t , t′ and there exists a reachable markingm such
that:
m
t−→ and m t
′
−→
We define the relation ≃ as the least congruence in the monoid Tr∗
such that, for all t, t′ ∈ Tr: t I t′ =⇒ tt′ ≃ t′t.
Lemma 34. Let N be an occurrence net, with a reachable marking
m. If m
U−→ then t I t′, for all t , t′ ∈ U.
Proof. Since m
U−→, then m t−→ for all t ∈ U. The thesis follows
by Definition 19. □
Lemma 35. Let N be an occurrence net, and let m be a reachable
marking. If m
t1−→∗m′ and m t2−→∗m′, then t1 ≃ t2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the longest
reduction among m
t1−→∗m′ and m t2−→∗m′. For the base case, the
thesis is trivial as both t1 and t2 must be empty. For the induc-
tive case, assume that t1 is longer or equal to t2 (the other case is
symmetric). Let t1 = t1t′1. We first show that t2 is not empty. By
contradiction, if t2 is empty, then m = m′. But then, by item 4 of
Lemma 31 (acyclicity) it follows that t1 is empty as well: contradic-
tion. Therefore, t2 = t2t′2 for some t2 and t′2. Clearly, t1 is longer
than t′1 and t′2. Let m
t1−→ m1 and m t2−→ m2. We have two subcases.
• If t1 = t2, by determinism (Lemma 31) it follows that m1 =
m2. Let m′′ = m1. By the hypothesis of the lemma, we
have m′′
t′1−→∗ m′ and m′′ t
′
2−→∗ m′. Then, by the induction
hypothesis we have t′1 ≃ t′2, and so the thesis t1t′1 ≃ t2t′2
follows since ≃ is a congruence.
• If t1 , t2, then by Definition 19 it must be t1 I t2. By
the diamond property (Lemma 31), there exists m′′ such
that m1
t2−→ m′′ and m2 t1−→ m′′. By linearity (item 3 of
Lemma 31), m′ ̸ t1−−→ and m′ ̸ t2−−→. By Lemma 32, applied on
m2, there exists t such thatm′′
t−→∗ m′ and |t | + 1 = |t′2 |. So,
we are in the following situation:
A true concurrent model of smart contracts executions
m′
m1
m m′′
m2
m′
/t2
t′ 1
t2t 1
t2
t
t1
t′2
/t1
Therefore, we have that:
m1
t2−→ t−→∗ m′ and m1
t′1−→∗ m′
m2
t1−→ t−→∗ m′ and m2
t′2−→∗ m′
Note that |t2t | = |t1t | = |t | + 1 = |t′2 | ≤ |t′1 | < |t1 |. Hence,
by applying the induction hypothesis twice:
t2t ≃ t′1 and t1t ≃ t′2
Then, since ≃ is a congruence:
t1t2t ≃ t1t′1 and t2t1t ≃ t2t′2
Since t1 I t2, then t1t2t ≃ t2t1t. By transitivity of ≃:
t1 = t1t′1 ≃ t1t2t ≃ t2t1t ≃ t2t′2 = t2 □
Definition 20. For all sequences of transitions t, we define the set
of transitions in t as:
tr(t) = {t | ∃t1, t2 : t = t1tt2}
and we extend tr to step firing sequences U as follows:
tr(U) =
⋃
{U | ∃U1,U2 : U = U1UU2}
Lemma 36. If t ≃ t′ then tr(t) = tr(t′).
Proof. Trivial by Definition 19. □
Lemma 37. Let N be an occurrence net, and let m be a reachable
marking. If m
U1−−→ m1, m U2−−→ m2 and tr(U1) = tr(U2), then m1 =
m2.
Proof. Since m
U1−−→ m1 and m U2−−→ m2, there exist sequential-
isation t1 of U1 and t2 of U2 such that m
t1−→ m1 and m t2−→ m2.
Since by hypothesis tr(U1) = tr(U2), then tr(t1) = tr(t2). We pro-
ceed by induction on the lenght of t1. The base case is trivial, as
m = m1 = m2. For the inductive case, suppose t1 = t1t′1, with|t′1 | = n. By determinism, there exists a unique marking m′1 such
that m
t1−→ m′1 (a single step). Since tr(U1) = tr(U2), it must be
t2 = t2t′2, with |t′2 | = n. Let m′2 be the unique marking such that
m
t2−→ m′2 (a single step). There are two subcases.
• If t1 = t2, it must be m′1 = m′2, and hence the thesis follows
immediately by the induction hypothesis.
• If t1 , t2, by the diamond property (item 1 of lemma 31),
there exists m′ such that m′1
t2−→ m′ and m′2
t1−→ m′. Since
t2 ∈ tr(t′1), by linearity (item 3 of Lemma 31) it follows that
m1 ̸ t2−−→, and hence, by applying Lemma 32 onm′1 we obtain
m′
t′′1−→ m1 for some t′′1 . Summing up, we have that:
m′1
t′1−→ m1 and m′1
t2t′′1−−−→ m1
Then, by Lemma 35, t′1 ≃ t2t′′1 , and hence:
t1 = t1t′1 ≃ t1t2t′′1
By Lemma 36:
tr(t1) = tr(t1t2t′′1 )
Similarly, we can conclude that m′
t′′2−→ m2 for some t′′2 and
that:
tr(t2) = tr(t2t1t′′2 )
Since tr(t1) = tr(t2), we can conclude:
tr(t′′1 ) = tr(t′′2 )
Since |t′′1 | = n − 1 < n + 1 = |t1 |, the thesis follows by the
induction hypothesis.
□
Lemma 38. Let (T, i) and (T′, j) be transitions of N#WR (B). Then:
(T, i) I (T′, j) =⇒ T#WR T′
Proof. ByDefinition 19, (T, i) I (T′, j) implies that (T, i) , (T′, j)
and there exists some reachable marking m such that m
(T,i)−−−→ and
m
(T′, j)−−−−→. By contradiction, assume that ¬(T#WR T′). Then, since
i < j or j > i , by Definition 10 we would have that (T, i) < (T′, j) or
(T′, j) < (T, i). Then, by Lemma 33 we obtain a contradiction. □
Definition 21. Let NR(B) = (P, Tr, F,m0). We define the function
α : Tr → Tx as α(T, i) = T. We then extend α to a function from
steps to multisets of transactions as follows:
α(∅) = [] α(U ∪ {t}) = [α(t)] + α(U)
Finally, we extend α to finite sequences of steps as follows:
α(ϵ) = ϵ α(UU) = α(U)α(U)
Lemma 39. Let NR(B) = (P, Tr, F,m0), and let U be a step firing
sequence. Then, for all Π,σ :JUKΠσ = Jα(U)KΠσ
Lemma 40. If t ≃ t′ in N#WR (B), then α(t) ≃#WR α(t
′).
Proof. Define:
≃′=
{
(t, t′)
α(t) ≃#WR α(t′)}
It suffice to show that ≃ ⊆ ≃′. Note that ≃′ is a congruence satisfy-
ing:
T#WR T
′ =⇒ (T, i)(T′, j) ≃′ (T′, j)(T, i)
But then, by Lemma 38, it follows that ≃′ also satisfies:
(T, i) I (T′, j) =⇒ (T, i)(T′, j) ≃′ (T′, j)(T, i) (6)
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Since ≃ is the smallest congruence satisfying eq. (6), we have that
≃ ⊆ ≃′, as required. □
Theorem 13. Let B = T1 · · · Tn . Then, in N# (B):
(a) if U and U′ are step firing sequences from m0 to m, thenJUKΠ⋆σ = JU′KΠ⋆σ , for all reachable σ .
(b) {(T1, 1)} · · · {(Tn ,n)} is a maximal step firing sequence;
(c) for all maximal step firing sequences U, and for all reachable
σ , JUKΠ⋆σ = JBKσ .
Proof. For item (a), assume that m0
U−→ m and m0 U
′
−−→ m. A
standard result from Petri nets theory ensures that there exists
sequentializations t of U and t′ of U′ such that:
m0
t−→ m and m0
t′−→ m
By Lemma 35, it must be t ≃ t′. Then, by Lemma 40:
α(t) ≃# α(t′)
By Lemma 18: Jα(t)Kσ = Jα(t′)Kσ
By Lemmas 34 and 38, it follows that all multisets of transactions in
α(U), as well as those in α(U′), are strongly swappable. Therefore,
by Theorem 28: Jα(U)KΠ⋆σ = Jα(U′)KΠ⋆σ
Then, by Lemma 39: JUKΠ⋆σ = JU′KΠ⋆σ
For item (c), let U′ = [t1] . . . [tn ], where n = |B |. It is trivial to see
that U′ is maximal and that B ◁ α(U′). By Theorem 28:Jα(U′)KΠ⋆σ = JBKσ
Since U and U′ are both maximal, by Lemma 37 and by item (a), it
follows that: JU′KΠ⋆σ = JUKΠ⋆σ
Since JU′KΠ⋆σ = Jα(U′)KΠ⋆σ (by Lemma 39), and so:JUKΠ⋆σ = JBKσ □
